Table of contents
First of all the disclaimer: I am invested in the LS Invest share. The share is only tradable in the over-the-counter market in Hamburg. It is therefore a stock with a narrow market, where even the smallest purchases on your part can lead to significant price increases, from which I profit accordingly. For at least 7 days after publication of this report, I will neither sell nor buy. Nothing I say or write is to be construed as investment, tax or legal advice.
After I have worked with Centrotec and Dignity PLC I've already discussed two special situations, but this time I've chosen a case that has already been heard for some time as underground noise on Twitter and in many forums. In order to understand the case and, above all, its potential opportunities and risks, you should take a lot of time, critically scrutinize it, and urgently discuss it again in advance with the entire Delisting- and Squeeze-Out-I will only discuss this in passing. You may then receive a case with LS Invest that is very promising due to significant hidden reserves and a potential squeeze-out.
Please also have a look at my detailed video on LS Invest, in which I have gone into the valuation in detail:
Those of you who are familiar with delisting issues are aware of a problem that always arises when valuing such stocks: Data timeliness. Delisted stocks no longer have to report on a quarterly basis, so in the worst case we only get detailed information on the status of the company twice a year. Through the annual financial statements and the Annual General Meeting.
The last financial report available to us is the quarterly report for Q1-2022, which comprises just 7 pages and is of little informative value if we want to form a comprehensive picture of the Group. In the following, I therefore largely refer to the detailed annual report and annual financial statements for 2021, but apart from that, I include all interim findings that I have at my disposal.
LS Invest is the operator and owner of 9 resort hotels and hotel complexes, as well as three healthcare businesses spread over two locations. In addition, the Group has in several steps secured a majority interest in two facilities, which are operated on a time-share model. The hotels are geographically spread over Germany (4 hotels), Austria (3 hotels), Spain (1 hotel) and the Dominican Republic (1 hotel). At least that was the case when I started writing this article. In the meantime, the picture has changed significantly, but more about that later.
The following overview shows the Group structure with the individual companies as of December 31, 2021:
Change of strategy
As part of a change in strategy, the Group has increasingly sold hotels in the mid-price range in recent years. In 2017, for example, three hotels in Gran Canaria and San Augustin, which were rated 3 to 4 stars when sold. What also followed was a significant capital increase that raised the share capital from 51.48 million to 128.7 million, resulting in gross issue proceeds of almost 200 million. Like the Securities prospectus and the investment plan published prior to the capital increase, the background to this was extensive measures, which included the renovation of the aging hotels, but also the capital-intensive construction of two new hotels. The new strategy was clearly aimed at a higher price range and both the Faro Hotel and the Playa Bávaro are rated 5 stars.
This new strategy also fits in with the news published a few days ago that LS Invest has sold the Fehmarn Hotel and the Südstrandklinik Fehmarn to the Spanish Azora Group in December 2022. Reading further in the article, one comes to the conclusion that it is quite likely that the other German hotels and health care operations have also been sold to the Azora Group, because it says: "The Azora Group will invest 40 million euros in the IFA facilities on Rügen, in Graal-Müritz, Schöneck in Vogtland and in the two clinics on Usedom and Fehmarn. [...] For the Fehmarn site, the Azora Group has established Balticum OpCo Fehmarn Hotel GmbH, which is part of the Azora Fund and is based in Frankfurt am Main, in November 2022." Searches like Dirk Hagemann in the commercial register after Balticum OpCo Fehmarn Hotel GmbH, one finds further companies which suggest that indeed all German properties have been sold.
The hotels also had a 3-4 star rating and were partly already considerably in the year. The Lopesan seems to trim LS Invest at least to a more exclusive price segment. The strategy also seems obvious to me, since the middle price range is still strongly characterized by family businesses and there is significantly more pressure from the competition here. Judging by the development in Germany, I have little doubt that the establishments in Austria will also be sold in the foreseeable future. These also have 3 to 4 stars and are also significantly smaller than the German operations. With 57 (IFA Alpenhof Wildental), 31 (IFA Breitach) and 100 rooms (IFA Alpenrose) the hotels no longer really fit the very modern, luxurious rooms and slightly larger (the Hotel Faro has 179 rooms) or much larger dimensions (the Lopesan Costa Bavaro has 1042 rooms) .
Investors who have been following the case of LS Invest for some time will have remembered that there was also speculation about other obvious reasons for the capital increase. One of the anchor shareholders, Lopesan Touristik S.A., which held 51.78% of the shares in LS Invest prior to the increase, was able to gain through the capital measure expand the shareholding to 76.26%. The second anchor shareholder, Newinvest Asset Beteiligungs GmbH, did not exercise its subscription rights and henceforth held only 13.52% of the voting rights. As I was able to learn from personal discussions with individual players not connected with the two companies, one reading at the time was that Lopesan wanted to force Newinvest out of the company through the capital increase. For the time being, we can regard this as anecdotal speculation, but I will come back to it later, as it is definitely relevant for today's investment case.
Of the originally planned investments, in accordance with the Annual Report 2021 completed the 1st construction phase of the hotel in Playa Bávaro as well as the renovation of the hotel IFA Faro. At that time, 5.2 million had been budgeted for investments in Germany and one million in Austria for the year 2022. The remaining projects were suspended for the time being due to the Covid pandemic, with the construction of the second hotel in the Dominican Republic described as "feasible in the medium term". However, this was to be dependent on the occupancy rate of the first hotel, among other factors. At the 2022 Annual General Meeting, the Board of Directors let it be known that construction work on the second hotel in the Dominican Republic had not yet begun, as they wanted to wait for the development of tourism in the post-Covid world before doing so.
If the measures were implemented, LS Invest predicted a significant increase in revenues from 92.3 to 252.3 million and an increase in EBITDA from 27.6 to 84.1 million within 5 years of the investment. The planned hotels in the Dominican Republic in particular played a significant role in this, which would have led to a clear geographical shift in revenue and EBITDA.
View on balance sheet, P&L & cash flow
When looking at the business development pre-Covid, several effects must be considered at once. The decline in sales by 2019 is primarily due to the reduction in hotel operations from 14 to 9 and the associated reduction in the number of beds from around 4400 to 3100.
The high EBITDA in 2018 and 2017 can be explained by the income from the deconsolidation of the sold hotels. This also results in the high difference between cash flow from operating activities and EBITDA. These one-off effects should always be removed from consideration when we look at the operating strength of a company. In 2017, the sales generated 64.2 million and in 2018 32.4 million euros.
The negative EBITDA in 2019 is attributable to two primary components. The Hotel Faro was closed for renovation from June 2019. As a result, revenue at the hotel declined year-on-year from EUR 11.9 million to EUR 5.1 million. In addition, the Costa Bávaro Hotel in the Dominican Republic did not open on schedule until May 1 and then still had to contend with special circumstances in the country. As a result of a crisis which at that time had not yet solved death series of vacation guests, there had been a lower volume of tourism. Together with start-up costs, this resulted in negative EBITDA for the hotel of EUR 9.2 million. However, the operating cash flow was clearly positive this year.
The figures from the Corona years 2020 and 2021 are distorted in two ways. One is due to the discernibly lower occupancy rates, which resulted in significantly lower revenues. Rooms at the Dominican Republic hotel were also significantly discounted to counteract external circumstances. On the other hand, due to the utilization of Corona aid and payouts from business closure insurance. Both components distort the result considerably, which is why I believe that the Group EBITDA is not interpretable for these years. Creating a normalized occupancy rate, especially for the new and renovated hotels, and normalizing earnings from this is highly prone to error, which is why I am ignoring the years 2020 and 2021 for the most part in further consideration.
With regard to the balance sheet, Q1-2022 is the last annual report available to us after the delisting. Here, the high cash balance of 89.3 million and the high equity ratio of 72.8% are particularly striking. This is primarily due to the capital increase and not full implementation of the planned investments. Originally, these were to be financed with the issue proceeds of 200 million and loans of 256 million. According to plan, this would have resulted in an equity ratio of overTP3T 501.
Valuation - Potential squeeze-out
The main reason why the name LS Invest can be read from time to time in forums and on Twitter is not its operational strength. In my opinion, this has been highly questionable in the past and when or whether the ambitious investments will be implemented remains as questionable as their success.
Speculation about a squeeze-out, i.e. the squeezing out of minority shareholders, has been dragging on for a while now and the reasons for the assumption are, in my view, quite understandable. As already mentioned, Lopesan Touristik S.A. was able to significantly increase its shares in LS Invest AG from 51 to 76% as part of the capital increase. This was followed on April 15, 2021 by the Announcement of the delisting, which legal must include the acquisition offer by Lopesan to the other shareholders to acquire their shares. Within the scope of which sold the second largest shareholderNewinvest Beteiligungs GmbH, sold the majority of its shares to Lopesan. Since then, the former holds only 0.4% instead of the previous 13.5% shares and Lopesan as of today 89.7%.
At this point, even the last person looking for special situations would have been suspicious. LS Invest was missing only 0.3% of the shares to reach the squeeze-out under merger law to enable a subsidiary to be excluded. In this case, the majority shareholder can exclude the minority shareholders in return for cash compensation if a parent company holds 90% of the subsidiary. This is precisely what applies to Lopesan and LS Invest in the possible event that the 90% threshold is exceeded. However, since July 12, 2021, i.e. after the announcement of the sale of the shares of Newinvest, nothing happened..... I will deliberately leave the possible reasons for this until after the valuation, as they are purely speculative.
Normally the Income capitalization approach the common meansin order to determine the cash settlement or the amount of a potential subsequent improvement. However, with the information available to me, this seems impossible, as LS Invest has a broken resume in terms of profitability due to Corona, some of the assets have been sold in the meantime and I have not received any quarterly reports since Q1-2022. Whether and to what extent the hotel in the Dominican Republic, which is operationally most relevant for an income approach, is characterized by success can only be assumed. With the availability of the 2022 financial statements and after the AGM, we may be able to make realistic assumptions again. In the following, I have therefore determined a realistic lower limit in the event of a squeeze-out to the best of my knowledge and belief, irrespective of the capitalized earnings value.
Legal and realistic lower limit
Pure legal the lower valuation limit for the cash compensation in the context of a squeeze-out is the share price. More precisely, the weighted average share price of the last 3 months according to §Section 5 WpÜG Offer Ordinance. So much for the sake of completeness. The realistic lower limit, on the other hand, is the book value of equity. According to the Commentary on the amount of severance pay by Angerer/Geibel/Süßmann the book value method already does not lead to an "appropriate compensation of the minority shareholders". In the past, there have been isolated appraisal proceedings in which a subsequent adjustment below the book value of the equity has taken place, but to my knowledge, this has primarily applied to banks, such as the Oldenburg State Bank. We can therefore assume that LS Invest will not be affected.
The book value of EK amounted to €403 million as of Q1-2022. Divided by the 49.3 million outstanding shares, this results in a value of €8.17 per share. I emphasize again that this was the realistic lower limit as of March 31, 2022, and thus represents the de facto bear case for the squeeze-out. However, the picture has already changed.
Expected increases in carrying amount
If we take the carrying amount as a realistic lower limit, then events that have already occurred or are expected to occur and lead to an increase in the carrying amount are of particular relevance to us. The sale of the German operations in December 2022 is just such an event. The sale price has not yet been published and LS Invest does not expect it to be. Therefore, we can only approximate the value that can realistically be assumed for the sale. In the recent past, i.e. from 2016 until today, properties from the group were sold twice. In 2017 the three hotels Beach, Dunamar and Continental, in 2018 the IFA Interclub Atlantic Hotel. I use these sales as a guide to determine a potential purchase price. The planned, but later failed sale of the Faro Hotel I also record.
The hotels and the hotel portfolio were included in the annual reports with the following NAV and EBITDA figures at the time of sale:
The IFA Interclub Hotel can be considered an outlier in terms of both book value and EBITDA multiple, which is why I have excluded it from the calculation of the average in order to adopt a cautious approach. However, it also illustrates how high the hidden reserves may be, as the Interclub was already heavily depreciated.
At Hotel Faro, the NAV at the time of signing the purchase agreement was 20.4 million. I am taking the NAV here because a cash balance of 7.8 million was also to be transferred on the assets side as part of the purchase. It therefore seems wrong to me to consider only the assets of the Faro Hotel as part of the sale. Moreover, the assets and liabilities of Faro and the corresponding disposal group are shown separately. The same applies to Interclub Atlantic.
The purchase agreement of the Faro Hotel included but as a condition the completion of the renovation and conversion measures, which were planned at 12.5 million and amounted to 12.4 million as of December 31, 2019. For this reason, I have included the investment in the carrying amount accordingly so as not to distort the multiple. This results in an average EBITDA multiple of 14.23 and a book value multiple of 2.36.
Since the years 2020-2022 were dominated by the Covid pandemic, I take 2019 as the basis for calculating the potential sales value for the entire hotel portfolio, which was also characterized by special effects (defective swimming pool, conversion due to fire protection measures), but overall fit conclusively into the long-lasting downward trend in EBITDA (decline from 13.1 million EBITDA in 2016 to 9 million in 2019). Strictly speaking, healthcare operations should be assigned its own multiple. However, for the sake of simplicity and the small share, I include them with the hotels. In 2019, health care operations generated 2.2 million EBITDA.
The book value of the individual German companies is not known, so I take as an alternative the reported equity of IFA Insel Ferien Anlagen GmbH & Co. KG from the individual financial statements (HGB) in the amount of approx. 46.5 million as of December 31, 2021.
To account for this, potentially poor comparability of German assets with Spanish ones, and declining hotel EBITDAs, I also assume an uncertainty discount of 20%.
I may be wrong, but according to the companies established specifically for the purpose of the acquisition and their Business purposeIn this case, it seems that an asset deal has been executed and not a share deal as before, where the properties are bought into the new companies. According to my understanding of the subject, this means that LS Invest would have to pay approximately 30% in taxes on the capital gain. Normally, however, conflicts of interest of this kind between buyer and seller are settled via the purchase price, i.e. the buyer has presumably paid a higher price than in the case of a share deal.
The sales in 2017 and 2018 were share dealsIn this case, no taxes were due on the profits and a presumably lower purchase price multiple was paid. In order to ensure a level playing field with regard to multiples, I also assume share deals, i.e. tax-free profits, as part of the calculation.
In Germany, capital gains of this type would usually be taxed at 1.5%. With regard to this topic, I would be grateful for assessments by persons with tax expertise.
It should also be noted that only 96.57% of IFA Insel Ferien Anlagen GmbH & Co. KG are in the hands of LS Invest. Strictly speaking, the sales proceeds attributable to the shareholders would have to be reduced accordingly. However, due to the small amount, I will refrain from making an adjustment below.
According to these assumptions, the following values result:
Since I assume that the assets in Austria will be sold soon, I apply the same principle to the hotels there. EBITDA shows how little these operations still fit in with the new dimensions of the Group, although Q1-2022 was already a bright spot in this respect. A higher value could also be assumed here with a clear conscience.
The Hotel Faro was valued by the buyer, although the sale ultimately fell through. Nevertheless, I take the purchase price as a basis here.
Taking all potential gains together, this results in a corridor of EUR 1.6 to 2.55 book value per share in the event of a sale. Especially in the case of German real estate, this is anything but unrealistic. The Twitter user BoWuMiKaSa has taken the trouble to look at the standard land values of the German properties and came already so on a higher value than the book value assumed by me. However, he also points out that the standard land value is not the same as the market value for such large plots of land. However, it is definitely an additional indicator for the 'actual' value, since the pure plots of land are on the balance sheet with very small amounts.
I have deliberately left out the hotel in the Dominican Republic, as it is relatively new and therefore still has a high book value, and has also not yet proven that it can also achieve the planned EBITDA figures. I have also left out the 3 properties in Valle Taurito, which are part of the potential liquidation mass, in which LS Invest has bought shares, because according to my current knowledge there is no access to the land and properties yet.
Finally, I would like to emphasize once again that all the above statements refer to the potential book value in the event of a squeeze-out and not to the net asset value.
ANFI - an opportunity that has so far been difficult to capture in figures
One of the greatest opportunities is offered by LS Invest's asset, which is the most difficult to understand. Here, too, BoWuMiKaSa, whose real name is Mathias, has made an exemplary attempt to shed some light on the darkness by once again Paper has brought. I will therefore take the liberty of dealing with the case here in brief.
ANFI is an insolvent company that operates two major plants under the time-share model in Gran Canaria and has run into financial difficulties due to legally contestable contracts. LS Invest bought 50% of the group in 2016 and put the 100% acquisition of the company in its 2018 investment plan.
Although half of ANFI was taken over by LS Invest AG, it did not have access to the site for a long time, owning only 33% of the voting rights. With the Purchase of liquidation rights in January 2022 by Manuel Cazorla, who owns 50% of the now insolvent Cazorla Group, which in turn owns 50% of the ANFI companies, LS Invest then had de facto control of ANFI. As a 'well-informed market participant' who was on site told me, the cooperation of LS parent company Lopesan with ANFI is already very close.
Then a few days ago came the Messagethat the insolvency administrator estimates the value of the ANFI Group at 404 million euros and that there are credit liabilities of 295 million. In the books of LS Invest, however, the 50% share is still listed as an investment with a value of 36 million euros, i.e. as of the annual report as of December 31, 2021.
The "interested investor" mentioned in the news item is almost certainly LS Invest. The company's new hotel boss was announced on the same day in a Interview quoted in which he said that they were planning with hotels with 2,500 additional beds on Gran Canaria, but that the final approval was still pending. There is a high probability that this refers to the ANFI site, as more hotels were originally planned there. In addition, one should know that for decades as good as no new hotel buildings are approved on the island.
If the company were to buy the remaining 50%, the ANFI Group would be consolidated accordingly with assets and liabilities in the consolidated balance sheet and the investment would have to be written up to the value of 202 million. This alone would result in a significant increase in equity. A tax payment would probably not be triggered, since in accordance with the lower of cost or market principle (HGB), any new valuation would only lead to extraordinary income upon sale. The market participant I quoted does not expect LS Invest to accept the offer of 404 million and understandably considers it unlikely that another company will become a minority shareholder in this constellation. He sees the value of the site more at 800 million. As things stand, however, the 404 million is the only tangible figure I have, so the potential increase in equity is as follows:
Measured against this development, it is understandable that LS Invest has sold the hotels in Germany, since at least on the face of it, it has agreed to both the purchase of the remaining 50% and the construction of the second hotel complex in the Dominican Republic in the foreseeable future. want. The latter was originally planned with an investment of 162.5 million euros. 2022, however, on the part of LS Invest/Lopesan, was called the figure 225 million.
Summary carrying amount
In summary, this results in a potential carrying amount of 9.74 excluding the write-up of ANFI and including the lower value in each case on the basis of the carrying amount and EBITDA multiples. Scenario 2 can be seen as a squeeze-out base case. 14.04 per share would represent an upside potential of about 110% at the time I am writing this article (€6.70 per share). The downside potential of 21.5%.
I would like to remind you again that the capitalized earnings method is the most likely valuation method. Another 'well-informed market participant', who has years of experience in appraisal proceedings, also considers values of EUR 20-25 per share to be probable in the case of subsequent improvement. However, I have also been informed by others that the Regional Court and the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf are somewhat ....'peculiar' to award proceedings. What you make of it is up to you.
Possible reasons/arguments for and against the squeeze-out
As promising as the valuation may appear in the event of a squeeze-out, the previous comments are almost irrelevant if this does not occur. Lopesan now had the opportunity to get above the 90% threshold for a long time, but apparently refrained from doing so so far. I would like to give some space to speculation about the possible reasons here.
What are the arguments against the squeeze-out?
One argument that I find quite convincing is that it makes little sense from Lopesan's point of view to accept the write-up of the value for ANFI before the squeeze-out, as this would increase the book value per share accordingly and thus also the lower limit for the cash compensation. However, which comes first, SO or takeover of ANFI, is speculation as of today.
However, the weightiest argument from my perspective is a simpler one and that is the long period of time we are now looking back at since Lopesan has 89.7% of the shares. During the Covid pandemic would have been a perfect time to argue for a small amount of rework. However, it was quite rightly pointed out to me here that this is looking in the rear view mirror and Lopesan itself did not know at that time what a world after or with Covid would look like.
Beyond that, however, I ask myself how sensible it is now to realize hidden reserves, such as the German holdings, before LS Invest has completely disappeared from the stock market. Here, however, the factors of time and capital could play a role. If, contrary to my original assumption, Lopesan realizes the capital from the hidden reserves of LS Invest 'now', it may well be that they cannot or do not want to pay a cash settlement at the present time and, moreover, still have to reckon with a subsequent improvement in the future. By the way, an award procedure can average 7 years drag on.
In fact, there is no need for a squeeze-out, so we may have to prepare for a long lean period.
What are the arguments in favor of the squeeze-out?
First and foremost, all the steps taken so far speak for this. These include, above all, the substantial capital increase and the delisting, which have brought Lopesan close to the 90% threshold.
In addition, a complete takeover would give Lopesan 100% access to the hidden reserves that are still presumed to exist on the balance sheet and could thus free up liquidity. The potential earnings value of the hotels in the Dominican Republic and on Gran Canaria would certainly not be brought to light and shared with the minority shareholders first, if possible.
The latter have already made life difficult for LS Invest, or Lopesan, in the past. I don't want to go into too much detail, but due to the lawsuit about a hotel that Lopesan presumably bought at too high a price, it was already necessary in the Past the AGM be postponed. Lawsuits of this kind can also be expected in the future if there is even a suspicion that the majority shareholder is helping itself too generously to LS Invest. This ensures costs and less directly effective decisions.
I can't say which side will prevail in the end. I have set myself the 'over'next AGM as the time horizon here and this brings me to my last point on content.
Even if there is no squeeze-out, I think the downside is very limited. A delisted share will always be traded at a discount, as we receive little information and the majority shareholder has no interest in driving the price up. Nevertheless, there are definitely expected events that should boost the share price in the short to medium term. With hotels reopening and lockdowns being lifted, the hotel in the Dominican Republic in particular should show its earning power. Here, it was said that LS Invest would only start the second construction phase once the occupancy rate of the first hotel had been reached. This is now apparently the case and also the Competitors report returning demand from the Dominican Republic.
Even if we take the current status without a second hotel complex in the DomRep and new hotels on Gran Canaria as a set, we should be able to with a corresponding utilization of the Faro Hotel and Playa Bávaro on the basis of the peers would result in a multiple that, even taking into account an appropriate discount, would lead to a price of at least €7.3 per share. As soon as the earnings power becomes visible, this should also be reflected in the share price. I am not yet taking into account the equity ratio, which is presumably still significantly better than that of our competitors.
In addition, it must be remembered that these were the target figures from 2018. With the inflation seen recently, this should also have a positive impact on room rates. The occupancy seen in Q1-2022 obviously already provided significantly higher room rates, revenue and EBITDA year-over-year. With annual occupancy above 90%, it should be possible to significantly exceed the planned EBITDA.
Operationally, I therefore see the downside as very limited.
Conclusion & Miscellaneous
LS Invest is a share for discussion and speculation. I am sure that every reader will discover at least one point in my remarks with which he or she disagrees. I am well aware of that and yet I wanted to put forward my view on LS Invest and invite discussion. As of now, I am invested with 14.4% of my portfolio at average buying prices of €6.26 per share. Therefore, I am grateful for any counter opinion to my assumptions.
LS Invest is not an easy stock to understand and also involves something I normally steer clear of, namely speculation about the motivation of the major players, i.e. the majority shareholder. LS Invest has passed my field of vision every now and then and this was the very reason why I have not gotten in so far. However, with the expected share price catalyst from more heavily utilized hotels, I now see the downside limited and am buying into an upside potential here through the squeeze-out speculation, which is more than promising. I am not in a position to say whether EUR 14 or EUR 25 per share is justified, but if LS Invest is taken over in full, I think it is very likely that the upside will at least be within this corridor. This is, of course, purely my opinion based on the previous comments.
Since it almost became a crowdsourcing project in the meantime, I would like to thank some people who are worth following, not only in this case. Dirk Hagemann and Matthias Schmitt brought me to this case in the first place. Jonathan Neuscheler was a continuous help for me to question my thesis and to bring new aspects into my field of vision. Mathias aka BoWuMiKaSa was virtually investigative and passed on new information to me on the same day. Without him, I would have missed out on a lot. Uwe Jännert was a very good contact person for me in terms of trial proceedings and book recommendations on this particular topic. I also had extensive discussions with two gentlemen, but I am almost certain that they would like to remain unmentioned. Nevertheless, my sincere thanks for the extensive information.
In addition, I would still like to do unpaid advertising for the SdK make. Especially in preparation for this case, I realized how important such associations are for us private investors.
Disclaimer: The author assumes no liability for the topicality, correctness, completeness or quality of the information provided. Liability claims against the author, which refer to material or immaterial nature caused by use or disuse of the information or the use of incorrect or incomplete information are excluded, unless the author is not intentional or grossly negligent fault. The author expressly reserves the right to change, supplement or delete parts of the pages or the entire offer without prior notice or to temporarily or permanently cease publication. The investment products and securities discussed in blog entries or other online publications are for illustrative purposes/opinion only and do not constitute investment recommendations. No liability is assumed for any losses.
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